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Abstract
Crampton and Sellwood recently introduced a variant of relationship-based access control
based on the concepts of relationships, paths and principal matching, to which we will refer
as the RPPM model. In this paper, we show that the RPPM model can be extended to
provide support for caching of authorization decisions and enforcement of separation of duty
policies. We show that these extensions are natural and powerful. Indeed, caching provides
far greater advantages in RPPM than it does in most other access control models and we
are able to support a wide range of separation of duty policies.
1 Introduction
Whilst the majority of computer systems employ some form of role-based access control model,
social networking sites have made use of the relationships between individuals as a means of
determining access to resources. Recent work on relationship-based access control models has
attempted to further develop this concept but has frequently remained focused on the relation-
ships that exist between individuals [4, 9]. Crampton and Sellwood define a more general model
for access control utilising relationships between entities, where those entities can represent any
physical or logical component of a system [7]. These entities and their (inter-)relationships are
described by a multigraph, called the system graph. Authorization requests in the RPPM model
are processed by first determining a list of matching principals. This list of principals is iden-
tified using principal-matching rules and the system graph. Once a list of matched principals
is determined, the specific action in the request is authorized or denied based on authorization
rules defined for those principals and the object.
The RPPM model provides the necessary foundations for general purpose relationship-based
access control systems, but there are a number of simple enhancements which would greatly
increase its utility and efficiency. The evaluation of path conditions can be complex in system
graphs containing many nodes of high degree. Support for caching of previously matched princi-
pals would significantly reduce the processing necessary during the evaluation of an authorization
request. The introduction of caching support is, therefore, our first enhancement.
Our second enhancement adds support for request evaluation audit records to be kept, such
that future authorization requests may be evaluated both on the current relationships within
the system graph but also using historical information about past actions by subjects. Such
mechanisms allow us to support constraints such as separation of duty and Chinese Wall policies
and lay a foundation for future work on workflow authorization using the model.
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The rest of this paper is arranged with background information on the RPPMmodel provided
in Section 2 and then the two enhancements described individually in Sections 3 (caching) and 4
(audit records). We discuss related work in Section 5 and draw conclusions of our contributions
and identify future work in Section 6.
2 The RPPM Model
The RPPM model, described in detail in [7], employs a system graph to capture the entities of a
system and their (inter-)relationships. The entities (physical or logical system components) are
nodes within the system graph whilst the relationships are labelled edges. The system graph’s
‘shape’ is constrained by a system model, which identifies the types of entities and relationship
which are supported. It does so by defining a permissible relationship graph whose nodes are the
possible types of entities in the system graph and whose labelled edges indicate the relationships
which may exist in the system graph between entities of the connected types.
Definition 1. A system model comprises a set of types T , a set of relationship labels R, a set of
symmetric relationship labels S ⊆ R and a permissible relationship graph GPR = (VPR, EPR),
where VPR = T and EPR ⊆ T × T ×R.
Definition 2. Given a system model (T,R, S,GPR), a system instance is defined by a system
graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of entities and E ⊆ V × V ×R. Making use of a mapping
function τ : V → T which maps an entity to its type, we say G is well-formed if for each entity
v in V , τ(v) ∈ T , and for every edge (v, v′, r) ∈ E, (τ(v), τ(v′), r) ∈ EPR.
Within the RPPM model, authorization requests have the form q = (s, o, a), where a subject
s requests authorization to perform action a on target object o. The authorization policy is
abstracted away from subjects by the use of security principals. These principals are matched
to requests through the satisfaction of path conditions using edges in the system graph, where a
path condition π represents a sequence of relations with specific labels from the set R.
Definition 3. Given a set of relationships R, we define a path condition recursively:
• ⋄ is a path condition;
• r is a path condition, for all r ∈ R;
• if π and π′ are path conditions, then π ; π′, π+ and π are path conditions.
A path condition of the form r or r, where r ∈ R, is said to be an edge condition.
Informally, π ; π′ represents the concatenation of two path conditions; π+ represents one or
more occurrences, in sequence, of π; and π represents π reversed; ⋄ defines an “empty” path
condition.
Definition 4. Given a set of relationships R, we define a simple path condition recursively:
• ⋄, r and r, where r ∈ R, are simple path conditions;
• if π 6= ⋄ and π′ 6= ⋄ are simple path conditions, then π;π′ and π+ are simple path conditions.
A path condition can describe highly complex and variable-length paths within the system
graph. However, Crampton and Sellwood proved that every path condition can be reduced to
an equivalent simple path condition [7, §2.2], thereby simplifying the design of the principal-
matching algorithm.
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Definition 5. Given a system graph G = (V,E) and u, v ∈ V , we write G, u, v |= π to denote
that G, u and v satisfy path condition π. Formally, for all G, u, v, π, π′:
• G, u, v |= ⋄ iff v = u;
• G, u, v |= r iff (u, v, r) ∈ E;
• G, u, v |= π ; π′ iff there exists w ∈ V such that G, u,w |= π and G,w, v |= π′;
• G, u, v |= π+ iff G, u, v |= π or G, u, v |= π ; π+;
• G, u, v |= π iff G, v, u |= π.
Definition 6. Let P be a set of authorization principals. A principal-matching rule is a pair
(π, p), where π is a path condition and p ∈ P is the associated principal. A list of principal-
matching rules is a principal-matching policy.
In the context of a principal-matching rule, a path condition is called the principal-matching
condition.
The request and system graph are evaluated against the principal-matching policy utilising
a principal-matching strategy (PMS) to determine the list of matched principals for the request.
The PMS specifies how principal-matching rules should be evaluated, for example whether the
first matching principal applies (in the case of the FirstMatch PMS) or whether all matching
principals apply (AllMatch). A default principal-matching rule (⊤, p′) may, optionally, be em-
ployed as the last rule in the policy and will automatically result in its principal p′ being matched
whenever the rule is evaluated.
A system graph G, two nodes u and v in G, a principal-matching policy ρ, and a principal-
matching strategy σ determines a list of principals MP associated with the pair (u, v). We
evaluate each principal-matching rule (π, p) in turn and add p to the list of matched principals
if and only if G, u, v |= π. We then apply the principal-matching strategy to the list of matched
principals to obtain MP . (Obviously, optimizations are possible for certain principal-matching
strategies.) We write G, u, v
ρ,σ
−−→ MP to denote this computation.
Once determined, the list of matched principals is used to identify relevant authorization
rules in the authorization policy.
Definition 7. An authorization rule has the form (p, o, a, b), where p is a principal, o is an
object, a is an action and b ∈ {0, 1}, where b = 0 denies the action and b = 1 grants the action.
In order to ease authorization policy specification we allow for the use of ⋆ instead of o, to
represent all objects, or instead of a, to represent all actions. These global authorization rules,
therefore, have the form (p, ⋆, a, b), (p, o, ⋆, b) or (p, ⋆, ⋆, b). An authorization policy is a list of
authorization rules.
The matching of principals to authorization rules yields a list of authorization decisions, which
is reduced to be single decision using a conflict resolution strategy (CRS). The CRS is used in
much the same way as a rule-combining or policy-combining algorithm is used in XACML. It
may specify that particular outcomes are prioritised, such as (AllowOverride or DenyOverride), or
that the first conclusive decision should be used (FirstMatch).
To summarise, given a request (s, o, a), where s and o are nodes in the system graph and
a is an action, we first compute the list of matched principals G, s, o
ρ,σ
−−→ MP . We then use
MP and the authorization policy to determine which actions are granted and denied for those
principals and apply the CRS to determine a final decision. In this paper, we assume the use of
the AllMatch PMS and DenyOverride CRS throughout.
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3 Caching
The most complex part of evaluating an authorization request in the RPPMmodel is the principal
matching stage [7, §3]. This process attempts to satisfy path conditions within principal-matching
rules using paths between the subject and the object of the request. It is important to note that
the requested action is immaterial during this processing stage (only becoming relevant when
the authorization rules are considered). The list of matched principals for a subject-object
pair remains static until a change is made to the system graph or certain associated policy
components. Even then, not all of the possible changes would impact the matched principals
between a particular subject and object.
We introduce the concept of caching edges and make use of the relative stability of matched
principals in order to reduce the processing required for future authorization requests. We first
redefine the system graph to support these new edges. In particular, when we evaluate a request
(s, o, a) that results in a list of matched principals MP , we add an edge (s, o,MP) to the system
graph, directed from s to o and labelled with MP .
Informally, a caching edge (s, o,MP ) directly links s to o and identifies the matching principals
MP relevant to requests of the form (s, o, a). The processing of subsequent authorization requests
can skip the principal matching stage and use MP in conjunction with the authorization rules
to evaluate a request of the form (s, o, a).
To illustrate, consider the simple system graph G1, shown in Figure 1a, and the following
principal-matching and authorization policies
ρ = [(r1, p1), (r2, p2), (r3, p3), (r1 ; r3, p4), (r2 ; r3, p5)]
PA = [(p5, ⋆, a1, 1), (p5, ⋆, a2, 0)].
If an authorization request q1 = (v2, v4, a1) is made, then G1, v2, v4
ρ,σ
−−→ [p5], because the
only principal-matching condition from the policy which can be satisfied between v2 and v4 in
G1 is r2 ; r3. Then the authorization rule (p5, ⋆, a1, 1) applies and the set of possible decisions
PD = {1}; thus the request is authorized. At this stage we may add a caching edge (v2, v4, [p5])
to produce the system graph shown in Figure 1b. We use the convention that caching edges have
a diamond-shaped arrow head.
v1
v2
v3 v4
r1
r2
r3
(a) original system graph fragment
v1
v2
v3 v4
r1
r2
r3
[p5]
(b) with caching edge
Figure 1: Adding a caching edge
If an authorization request q2 = (v2, v4, a2) is subsequently made, the caching edge
(v2, v4, [p5]) allows us to evaluate the request without re-evaluating the principal-matching policy;
the authorization rule (p5, ⋆, a2, 0) subsequently results in request q2 being denied (PD = {0}).
To consider the scale of the potential benefit of caching edges, we review the experimental
data reported by Crampton and Sellwood for numbers of nodes visited (n) and edges considered
(e) during sample request evaluations (see Table 1 and [7, §3.3]). With support for caching
edges, if the subject-object pairs participating in any of these requests were to be involved in
subsequent requests the processing would instead be limited to locating the appropriate caching
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edge. It should be clear that when considering requests which may require upwards of 50 edge
evaluations (in a small example system graph), replacing this with a single caching edge lookup
could dramatically improve evaluation performance.
Table 1: Experiment results from [7, §3.3]
Path condition Request n e Match Found
π1 q1 5 19 Yes
π1 q2 7 24 Yes
π2 q3 4 15 Yes
π3 q4 17 58 Yes
π3 q5 7 24 No
In the worst case, the number of caching edges directed out of a node is O(|V |), where V is
the set of nodes in the system graph. However, there are strategies that can be used to both
prevent the system graph realizing the worst case and to reduce the impact of large numbers
of caching edges. To maintain an acceptable number of caching edges, we could, for example,
use some form of cache purging. We can also distinguish between relationship edges and caching
edges using some flag on the edges and index the caching edges to dramatically decrease the time
taken to search the set of caching edges. Employing these techniques should enable the benefits
of caching edges to be realised without incurring unacceptable costs during identification of the
relevant caching edge. Further experimental work is required to determine how best to make use
of caching edges.
3.1 Preemptive Caching
Any optimisation provided by the caching of matched principals relies upon the existence of a
caching edge in order to reduce the authorization request processing; the first request between
a subject and object must, therefore, be processed normally in order to determine the list of
matched principals which will label the caching edge. If this initial evaluation were only per-
formed when an authorization request were submitted, then the benefit of caching edges would
be limited to repeated subject-object interactions alone.
However, many authorization systems will experience periods of time when no authorization
requests are being evaluated. The nature of many computing tasks is such that authorization
is required sporadically amongst longer periods of computation by clients of the authorization
system and idle time for the authorization system itself. These periods of reduced load on the
authorization system can be employed for the purpose of preemptive caching.
Thus for pairs of nodes (u, v) in the system graph, we may compute G, u, v
ρ,σ
−−→ MP and
insert a caching edge (u, v,MP). The fact that a request’s action is not employed during the
principal matching process means that to perform this further optimization an authorization
system solely requires a subject and object between whom the matched principals are to be
identified. There are numerous potential strategies for determining which subject-object pairs
should be considered for preemptive caching. Here we describe two simple and natural strategies.
Subject-focused. Subject-focused preemptive caching assumes that subjects who have recently
made authorization requests are active and so will likely make further requests. The autho-
rization system, therefore, prioritises determining the list of matched principals between
the most recently active subjects and a set of target objects. The set of target objects could
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be selected at random or may be systematically chosen using an appropriate mechanism
for the system defined in the system graph. This might involve the target objects being
popular, significant or those whose access may be particularly time-sensitive. We envis-
age that the interpretation of these concepts may be system specific, as may their relative
worth.
As preemptive caching builds the number of caching edges within the system graph the
number of subjects and objects under consideration could be expanded to provide greater
coverage of the potential future requests.
Object-focused. In certain applications, there will be resources that will be used by most users,
such as certain database tables. Thus, it may make sense to construct caching edges for
all active users for certain resources.
No matter the strategy, preemptive caching makes use of available processing time in order
to perform the most complex part of authorization request evaluation: principal matching. Any
requests that are made utilising a subject-object pair which have already been evaluated by
preemptive caching will be able to make use of the caching edge already established, even if
that request were the first received for that pair. Once determined, caching edges resulting from
preemptive caching are no different from those established as a result of request evaluation.
3.2 Cache Management
A change to any of the following components of the model could modify the list of matched
principals for a subject and object:
• the system graph;
• the principal-matching policy;
• the principal-matching strategy.
Such changes, therefore, may affect the correctness of caching edges. (The obvious exception is a
change to the system graph resulting from the addition or deletion of a caching edge.) The most
crude management technique for handling such changes involves removing all caching edges from
the system graph whenever one of the above changes occurs.
In certain specific scenarios it may be possible for a system to identify a scope of impact
for a particular change and thus apply a more refined management technique. For example, if
a change to the principal-matching policy removes all rules which are used to match a certain
principal (and nothing more), then it would be sufficient for only caching edges labelled with
a list including that principal to be purged. Whilst such a refinement may further optimise
the operations performed by the authorization system, its applicability will depend upon the
configuration of the authorization system in its entirety.
We have already noted that it may make sense to purge the cache in order to limit the number
of caching edges in the system graph. Again, there are several possible purging strategies. One
would be simply to set a maximum threshold for the number of caching edges in the system graph.
A second, perhaps more useful, strategy would be to set a maximum threshold for the out-degree
(measured in terms of caching edges) for any node in the graph. We may also “retire” caching
edges: any edge that hasn’t been used as part of a request evaluation for some time period will
be purged. And we could employ mixed strategies, which might depend on the application and
the nature of the system graph.
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4 Audit Records
Currently, the RPPM model’s authorization request processing is “memoryless” with respect to
previous requests and their respective outcomes. Various scenarios and security policy principles
make use of historical data. Reputation systems and history-based access control (HBAC) sys-
tems [1, 8, 14], for example, rely on knowledge of previous interactions and requests in order to
correctly make authorization decisions. The Chinese Wall [3] and non-static separation of duty
principles [11, 15] also rely on knowledge of previous actions to enforce their constraints.
We introduce the concept of audit edges, through which we track the outcomes of authoriza-
tion requests for subsequent use in policy evaluation. Audit edges come in two flavours: those
which directly record the decision of a previous authorization request (authorized and denied de-
cision audit edges) and those which, more generally, record an entity’s interest in other entities
based on its authorized requests (active and blocked interest audit edges). It should be noted
that whilst we make direct use of audit edges for policy evaluation, they also have value in a
system purely as an audit record. We extend the set of relationships and further redefine the
system graph to support these new edges. Specifically, in the case of decision audit edges:
• for each action a, we define two relationships a⊕ and a⊖ and include the sets {a⊕ : a ∈ A}
and {a⊖ : a ∈ A} in the set of relationships;
• if the decision for request (u, o, a) is allow, then we add the edge (u, o, a⊕) into the system
graph;
• if the decision for request (u, o, a) is deny, then we add the edge (u, o, a⊖) into the system
graph.
Both authorized and denied decision audit edges are inserted, automatically, into the system
graph after request evaluation completes. If such an edge does not already exist, a decision audit
edge is added between the subject and object of the evaluated request, indicating its result.
The addition of interest audit edges also occurs automatically after request evaluation com-
pletes. For such edges, the subject is the source node of the interest edge (as for decision audit
edges); however, the destination node may not be the object of the request. Interest audit edges
are discussed in more detail in Section 4.2.
4.1 Enforcing Separation of Duty
Separation of duty requires that certain combinations of actions are performed by a number of
distinct individuals so as to reduce the likelihood of abuse of a system. In its simplest form,
separation of duty constraints require two individuals to each perform one of a pair of distinct
actions so that a single individual cannot abuse the system. A common application environment
for such constraints is that of a finance system, where, for example, the individual authorized to
add new suppliers should not be the same individual who is authorized to approve the payment
of invoices to suppliers. If a single individual were able to perform both of these actions they
could set themselves up as a supplier within the finance system and then approve for payment
any invoices they submitted as that supplier. We define a mechanism here through which n
individuals can be required to perform n actions on an object. Before doing so, we explain a
simplified version of the mechanism for the case n = 3.
Let us consider the system graph G2 (see Figure 2a), the principal-matching policy ρ = [(r, p)]
and the authorization policy PA = [(p, o, ⋆, 1)]. With these policies and without audit edges, if
individual u1 makes the request q1 = (u1, o, a1) this will be authorized by matching principal
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u1 o
u2
u3
r
r
r
(a) system graph fragment
u1 o
u2
u3
r
r
r
a⊕1
a⊖2
a⊖3
a⊕3
a⊕2
a⊖3
(b) after request q6 = (u2, o, a3)
Figure 2: Adding decision audit edges
p, as will subsequent requests q2 = (u1, o, a2) and q3 = (u1, o, a3). A similar result would have
occurred if these requests had been submitted with u2 or u3 as the subject.
A basic implementation of separation of duty can be employed by introducing a new principal
pseen which matches if a user has performed any action on the object. We change the principal-
matching and authorization policies to
[(a⊕1 , pseen), (a
⊕
2 , pseen), (a
⊕
3 , pseen), (r, p)] and [(pseen, o, ⋆, 0), (p, o, ⋆, 1)]
respectively1. Using this combination of policies means that any user who has performed an
action on object o is prevented from performing another action as all actions are denied to the
principal pseen.
Whilst this basic implementation fulfils the requirement that no user may perform more than
one action on the object, we may wish to specify more refined separation of duty policies within
the system. The basic implementation has several limitations which RPPM’s policies are flexible
and powerful enough to resolve. Specifically, all actions within the system are included in the
separation of duty constraint due to the use of an authorization rule for all actions (pseen, o, ⋆, 0).
Additionally, having performed an action on o a user is unable to repeat the action performed,
as well as being unable to perform any other action.
If we wish to enforce a more flexible separation of duty constraint on a subset of actions
{a1, a2, a3} ⊆ A such that distinct individuals are required to perform each action, we can modify
the principal-matching policy to ρ = [(a⊕1 , p1), (a
⊕
2 , p2), (a
⊕
3 , p3), (r, p)] and the authorization
policy to:
PA = [(p1, o, a2, 0), (p1, o, a3, 0), (p2, o, a1, 0), (p2, o, a3, 0),
(p3, o, a1, 0), (p3, o, a2, 0), (p, o, ⋆, 1)]
The first action. Revisiting our example for G2, an initial request q1 = (u1, o, a1) will, once
again, be authorized (with MP = [p]) but will, this time, result in the addition of an
authorized decision audit edge (u1, o, a
⊕
1 ). If u1 then makes a request q2 = (u1, o, a2) this
will be denied as MP = [p1, p] and the authorization rule (p1, o, a2, 0) indicates a deny
which overrides the authorization from the rule (p, o, ⋆, 1). Similarly if u1 makes a request
q3 = (u1, o, a3) this will be denied as once again MP = [p1, p] and the deny authorization
rule (p1, o, a3, 0) overrides (p, o, ⋆, 1). These two denied requests would result in denied
decision audit edges (u1, o, a
⊖
2 ) and (u1, o, a
⊖
3 ).
The second action. However, if u3 makes the request q4 = (u3, o, a2) this will be authorized
with MP = [p] and use of the authorization rule (p, o, ⋆, 1); the authorized decision audit
1We assume the use of the AllMatch PMS and the DenyOverride CRS, but we could equally employ the
FirstMatch PMS with any CRS as long as we ensure that the constraint principal-matching rules are added before
any existing rules.
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edge (u3, o, a
⊕
2 ) results. If u3 attempts to then make request q5 = (u3, o, a3) this will be
denied in the same manner that request q3 was, with the subsequent addition of a denied
decision audit edge (u3, o, a
⊖
3 ).
The last action. As a1 was performed by u1 and a2 was performed by u3 it remains, for
successful operation, for u2 to make request q6 = (u2, o, a3). This request will be authorized
with MP = [p] and the use of the authorization rule (p, o, ⋆, 1), resulting in the authorized
decision audit edge (u2, o, a
⊕
3 ). The system graph that results after all of these requests
have been made is as shown in Figure 2b.
More generally, suppose we have a principal-matching policy ρ and an authorization policy
PA. If we require that the actions {a1, . . . , an} should each be performed by different users (and
the same action may be repeated), we add the rules
(a⊕1 , p1), . . . , (a
⊕
n , pn)
to ρ and let the new policy be ρ′. And for each principal pi, we add the set of rules
{(pi, o, aj , 0) : 1 ≤ j ≤ n, j 6= i} .
to PA denoting the new policy PA′. We then have the following result
Proposition 1. Given an RPPM separation of duty policy, as described above, for any user u
the request (u, o, a) is allowed if the request is authorized by ρ′ and PA′ and no request of the
form (u, o, a′), where a′ 6= a, has been previously authorized; the request is denied otherwise.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the number of evaluated requests. Consider the (base)
case when no requests have yet been made. A request (u, o, a) where a ∈ {a1, . . . , an} will not
match any of the n inserted principal-matching rules as no decision audit edges currently exist
in the system graph. Thus request (u, o, a) will be authorized if it is authorized by ρ and PA
(and hence will be authorized by ρ′ and PA′).
Now suppose the result holds for all sequences of m requests and consider the request (u, o, a)
where a ∈ {a1, . . . , an}.
• If u has previously performed a constrained action ai, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then the request will
satisfy principal-matching condition (a⊕i , pi).
Now, if ai = a, there is no authorization rule of the form (pi, o, ai, 0) and the request will,
therefore, be authorized if and only if it is authorized by ρ and PA.
Conversely, if ai 6= a, then a = aj , for some j 6= i, and the authorization rule (pi, o, a, 0),
together with the DenyOverride CRS will cause the request to be denied.
• If user u has not previously performed a constrained action then the request will not match
any of the principal-matching rules that were added to create ρ′. Thus the request will
only be authorized if it is authorized by ρ and PA.
4.2 Enforcing Chinese Walls
The Chinese Wall principle may be used to control access to information in order to prevent any
conflicts of interest arising. The standard use case concerns a consultancy that provides services
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to multiple clients, some of whom are competitors. It is important that a consultant does not
access documents of company A if she has previously accessed documents of a competitor of A.
To support the Chinese Wall policy, systems classify data using conflict of interest classes [3],
indicating groups of competitor entities. Requests to access a company’s resources within a
conflict of interest class will only be authorized if no previous request was authorized accessing
resources from another company in that conflict of interest class.
Unlike the general approach for separation of duty, a general approach for Chinese Wall
requires fewer policy changes but does rely on a particular basic layout of system graph. This
layout is such that the users who will be making requests are connected (directly or indirectly)
to the companies (which may or may not be competitors of each other). These companies are
then connected to their respective data entities, which will be the targets of users’ requests. This
arrangement is depicted, conceptually, in Figure 3a, with the path condition π1 representing the
chain of relationships between users and companies and π2 between the data entities and the
companies.2 In other words, the path from an authorized user to a company will contain the
same labels (and will match the path condition π1), irrespective of the specific identities of the
user and company. Similarly, the path from a data object to its owner company will contain the
same labels (and match the path condition π2). Thus, the principal that is authorized to access
companies’ data objects would be matched using the path condition π1 ; π2.
users companies data entities
COICs
π1 π2
m
a⊕
a⊖
(a) basic layout with COICs
users companies data entities
COICs
π1 π2
mi⊕
i⊖
a⊕
a⊖
(b) with audit edges
Figure 3: Chinese Wall Generalisation
To support the Chinese Wall constraint, the basic layout is supplemented by conflict of
interest classes, to which companies are connected directly by the member (m) relationship (see
Figure 3a). We assume here that membership of conflict of interest classes is determined when the
system graph is initially populated and remains fixed through the lifetime of the system. When
users are authorized (or denied) access to particular data entities, authorized (or denied) decision
audit edges will result for these requests as shown in Figure 3b. We additionally introduce interest
audit edges into the system graph which are added between users and companies (see Figure 3b).
Active interest audit edges are labelled with i⊕, blocked interest audit edges are labelled with
i⊖. We, therefore, extend the set of relationships to include the set {i⊕, i⊖}, thus allowing the
system graph to support these new edges. Graphically, we represent active interest audit edges
with a filled circle head, whilst blocked interest audit edges have a filled square head.
Informally, when a subject’s request to access a company’s data is authorized, an active
interest audit edge is added (if it doesn’t already exist) between the subject and the company
whose data was accessed. (We will also add an authorized decision audit edge between the
subject and the data entity if it does not already exist.) Additionally, blocked interest audit
edges are added (if they don’t already exist) between the subject and all other companies who
2It should be noted that Figure 3 does not show system graphs; it shows high-level representations of the
‘shape’ of a system graph.
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are members of the conflict of interest class to which the first company is a member. Interest
audit edges are not added after denied authorization requests.
For a concrete example, consider the system graph G4 shown in Figure 4a, where a member
of staff u1 works for an employer e1. This employer supplies numerous clients (c1, c2 and c3)
which have data in the form of files (f1, f2, f3 and f4). In this example users are connected to
companies by π1 = w ; s whilst data entities are connected to companies by π2 = d.
u1
e1c1
c2
c3
f1
f4
f3
f2
i1 i2
w
s
s
s
d
d
d
d
m
m
m
(a) system graph fragment
u1
e1c1
c2
c3
f1
f4
f3
f2
i1 i2
w
s
s
s
d
d
d
d
m
m
m
read⊕
i⊕
i⊖
read⊖
read⊕
read⊕
i⊕
(b) after request q4 = (u1, f3, read)
Figure 4: Enforcing the Chinese Wall policy in RPPM
If we assume the existence of a principal-matching policy ρ = [(w ; s ; d, p)] and authorization
policy PA = [(p, ⋆, read, 1)], then u1 would be authorized to read all files. However, the clients
are members of conflict of interest classes (i1 and i2) with clients c1 and c2 being competitors in
i1. Accordingly, we modify the principal-matching and authorization policies as follows:
ρcw = [(i
⊖ ; d, pcw ), (w ; s ; d, p)] and PAcw = [(pcw , ⋆, ⋆, 0), (p, ⋆, read, 1)].
We now consider four different types of request that can arise. Figure 4b shows the graph
G4 after all four requests have been made.
Initial declaration of interest. The request q1 = (u1, f1, read) to read data belonging to client
c1 in the graph G4 will be authorized: the first principal-matching rule is not matched but
the second one is. Thus MP = [p] and the request is authorized, resulting in an authorized
decision audit edge (u1, f1, read
⊕) being added to the graph along with the interest edges
(u1, c1, i
⊕) and (u1, c2, i
⊖).
Continued interest. If u1 makes a second request q2 = (u1, f4, read) for data of client c1 this
will also be authorized. The first principal-matching rule cannot be matched, as before,
and the second can with principal p, once again, being authorized to read all objects. The
authorized decision audit edge (u1, f4, read
⊕) will be added to the graph but no new interest
edges are added as the required edges already exist.
Conflict of interest request. If u1 requests data for a competing client c2 using a third request
q3 = (u1, f2, read), this will be denied. This time, the principal-matching rule (i
⊖ ; d, pcw )
is matched and pcw is denied all actions on all objects. A denial audit edge (u1, f2, read
⊖)
is added to the graph.
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New declaration of interest which doesn’t conflict. Lastly u1 makes a request q4 =
(u1, f3, read) for data of a third client c3 who does not conflict with c1 (with member-
ship in a different conflict of interest class). As with the first two requests, this request will
be authorized using the second principal-matching rule and matched principal p. An au-
thorized decision audit edge (u1, f3, read
⊕) is then added to the graph along with the active
interest edge (u1, c3, i
⊕). No blocked interest edges are added as there are no companies
other than c3 who are members of conflict of interest class i2.
More generally, suppose we have a principal-matching policy ρ. In order to enforce the Chinese
Wall constraint using this basic layout we add a new principal-matching rule (i⊖ ; π2, pcw ) to ρ
to produce a new policy ρcw . The pcw principal is denied all actions on all data entities through
the inclusion of an authorization rule (pcw , ⋆, ⋆, 0) into the existing authorization policy PA,
producing a new authorization policy PAcw .
3
Proposition 2. Given an RPPM Chinese Wall constraint, as described above, for any user u
the request (u, o, a) is allowed if the request is authorized by ρcw and PAcw and the user u does
not have an active interest in any company c′ which is a member of the same conflict of interest
class as the company c 6= c′ responsible for o. In all other cases the request is denied.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the number of evaluated requests. Consider the
(base) case when no requests have yet been made. A request q1 = (u
′, o, aj) will not match the
inserted principal-matching rule (i⊖ ; π2, pcw ) as no blocked interest audit edges currently exist
in the system graph. By assumption, request q1 will match a preexisting principal-matching
rule with principal-matching condition π1 ; π2 and in doing so will match principal p. Also by
assumption, principal p is authorized to perform action aj , therefore, the audit edge (u
′, o, a⊕j )
will be added to the system graph. Additionally, the active interest edge (u′, c, i⊕) will be added
where c represents the company the target data entity o belongs to (i.e. there is a path of
relations satisfying π2 between o and c as required by the basic layout). Lastly, blocked interest
edges (u′, c′, i⊖) will be added for each company c′ 6= c in the same conflict of interest class; these
companies are identified through the existence of edges (c′, i′,m) in the system graph where there
is also an edge (c, i,m) with i′ = i.
Now consider the case when request qx+1 = (u
′′, o′, ak) is made after x requests have been
successfully evaluated. We assume, without loss of generality, that data entity o′ belongs to
company c1, a member of conflict of interest class i1.
• If user u′′ has no active interests in any company, then request qx+1 will not match the
inserted principal-matching rule (i⊖ ; π2, pcw ) as no blocked interest audit edges currently
exist in the system graph for u′′. By assumption, request q1 will match a preexisting
principal-matching rule with principal-matching condition π1 ;π2 and in doing so will match
principal p. Also by assumption, principal p is authorized to perform action ak, therefore,
the audit edge (u′, o′, a⊕k ) will be added to the system graph. The active interest edge
(u′′, c1, i
⊕) will be added to the system graph, as will blocked interest edges (u′′, cy, i
⊖) for
each company cy 6= c1 who is a member of the conflict of interest class i1.
• If user u′′ has an active interest in company c1, then request qx+1 will not match the
inserted principal-matching rule (i⊖ ; π2, pcw ) as an active, rather than blocked, interest
audit edge exists between u′′ and c1. By assumption, request q1 will match a preexisting
principal-matching rule with principal-matching condition π1 ;π2 and in doing so will match
3Once again, whilst we use the AllMatch PMS and the DenyOverride CRS we could equally employ the First-
Match PMS with any CRS as long as we ensure that the constraint principal-matching rules are added before any
existing rules.
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principal p. Also by assumption, principal p is authorized to perform action ak, therefore,
the audit edge (u′, o′, a⊕k ) will be added to the system graph. The active interest edge
(u′′, c1, i
⊕) will not be added to the system graph as it already exists. Blocked interest
edges (u′′, cy, i
⊖) for each company cy 6= c1 who is a member of the conflict of interest class
i1 will be added where they do not already exist.
• If user u′′ has an active interest in company c2 which is a member of the same conflict of
interest class i1 as c1, then request qx+1 will, in this instance, match the inserted principal-
matching rule (i⊖ ; π2, pcw ). As the principal pcw applies the inserted authorization rule
(pcw , ⋆, ⋆, 0) overrides the assumed authorization achieved through principal p. The denied
decision audit edge (u′, o′, a⊖k ) will be added to the system graph and no interest audit
edges will be added.
• If user u′′ has an active interest in company c3 which is a member of a different conflict
of interest class i2 to c1 but no active interest in any company which is a member of the
conflict of interest class i1 to which c1 is a member, then request qx+1 will not match
the inserted principal-matching rule (i⊖ ; π2, pcw ) as no interest audit edge exists between
u′′ and c1. By assumption, request q1 will match a preexisting principal-matching rule
with principal-matching condition π1 ; π2 and in doing so will match principal p. Also
by assumption, principal p is authorized to perform action ak, therefore, the audit edge
(u′, o′, a⊕k ) will be added to the system graph. The active interest edge (u
′′, c1, i
⊕) will
be added to the system graph, as will blocked interest edges (u′′, cy, i
⊖) for each company
cy 6= c1 who is a member of the conflict of interest class i1.
The basic model described above is consistent with that used by Brewer and Nash, where
there is a simple and fixed relationship between users and companies (path condition π1) and
between data objects and companies (path condition π2). However, this approach is unnecessarily
restrictive (and was chosen for ease of exposition), in that we may wish to define more complex
authorization requirements between such entities. In practice, there is no reason why multiple
path conditions cannot be used between users, objects and companies, each of which is mapped
to the appropriate principal.
For example, given two paths of relations between users and companies (w ;s and w ;p ;s) and
two paths of relations between data entities and companies (d and f ; d) the principal-matching
policy from our running example is modified to include both options for blocking paths and all
combinations for normal authorization.
ρcw2 = [(i
⊖ ; d, pcw2), (i
⊖ ; d ; f, pcw2),
(w ; s ; d, p), (w ; s ; d ; f, p), (w ; p ; s ; d, p), (w ; p ; s ; d ; f, p)]
5 Related Work
Relationship-based access control is becoming an increasingly important alternative approach to
specifying and enforcing authorization policies. A number of models have been proposed in recent
years [4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 17], but most have focused on access control in social networks [4, 5, 6, 9, 17]. In
this paper, we extend the RPPM model of Crampton and Sellwood [7] by introducing additional
types of edges to support efficient request evaluation and history-based access control policies.
History-based access control, where an authorization decision is dependent (in part) on the
outcome of previous requests, has been widely studied since Brewer and Nash’s seminal paper
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on the Chinese Wall policy [3]. The enforcement mechanism for this policy is based on a his-
tory matrix, which records what requests have previously been allowed. It is very natural to
record such information as audit edges in the system graph and to use these edges to define and
enforce history-based policies. Fong et al. recently proposed a relationship-based model that in-
corporated temporal operators, enabling them to specify and enforce history-based policies [10].
This work extended Fong’s ReBAC model, developed in the context of social networks, and is
thus unsuitable for the more generic access control applications for which the RPPM model was
designed. In particular, there is no obvious way in which it can support Chinese wall policies.
There has been some interest in recent years in reusing, recycling or caching authorization
decisions at policy enforcement points in order to avoid recomputing decisions [2, 12, 13, 16]. In
principle, these techniques are particularly valuable in large-scale, distributed systems, providing
faster decisions, and the potential to recover from failures in the communication infrastructure
or failure of one of the components, in the (distributed) authorization system. However, many of
the techniques are of limited value because the correlation between access control decisions and
the structure of access control policies is typically rather low. In contrast, caching in the RPPM
model has the potential to substantially speed up decision-making because a cached edge is of
real value as it enables the decision-making apparatus to sidestep the expensive step of principal
matching and proceed directly to evaluating the authorization policy. Moreover, a cached edge
applies to multiple requests, irrespective of whether the request has previously been evaluated,
unlike many, if not all, proposals in the literature.
6 Conclusion
The RPPM model fuses ideas from relationship-based access control (by using a labelled graph),
role-based access control (in its use of principals to simplify policy specification) and Unix (by
mapping a user-object relationship to a principal before determining whether a request is autho-
rized). This unique blend of features make it suitable for large-scale applications in which the
relationships between users are a crucial factor in specifying authorization rules.
In addition to these advantages, the RPPM model is particularly suitable for recording infor-
mation that may be generated in the process of making authorization decisions. In this paper,
we focus on two new types of edges. Caching edges introduce shortcuts in the system graph in-
dicating the principals associated with a user-object pair. Such edges can introduce substantial
efficiencies to the evaluation of decisions. Audit edges allow for the enforcement of history-based
policies, including separation of duty and Chinese wall policies.
The introduction of audit edges lays the foundation for future work supporting workflow tasks
within the RPPM model. This work may, additionally, require the model to be further extended
with the introduction of stateful entities.
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